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COMMENTARY
Controlled Confusion
By Jan Matti Dollbaum, Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
On January 15, Russian president Vladimir Putin unexpectedly announced major constitutional 
changes. On the same day, Prime Minister Dmitry Med-
vedev and his government resigned to “offer the presi-
dent the opportunity to make the decisions he needs to 
make”. Within a week, a new government headed by the 
former chief of the federal tax service Mikhail Mishus-
tin was in office and parliament accepted the constitu-
tional changes in a first reading.
It seems thus that Putin did it again: He surprised 
observers and most of the Russian elite with a move 
that is part of a yet unknown but potentially decisive 
plan. Consequently, the events have been described as 
a “special operation”: fast moves with as few informed 
aides as possible—arguably Putin’s preferred mode of 
action. The timing signals Putin’s ability to maneuver 
elites and to control the agenda. Not that this was ever 
in doubt, but publicly visible reassurance is important 
to sustain his image as the ultimate arbiter and person-
ification of power.
The changes that the first reading of the bill intro-
duced are widely believed to lay the institutional foun-
dations for extending Putin’s de-facto rule beyond 
2024 when he will have to step down as president. At 
first glance, commentators saw the division of powers 
increase: The president will only be allowed two terms, 
consecutive or not, and the parliament will have a greater 
say in the appointment of ministers (excluding the ones 
from the “security block”). Upon closer inspection, how-
ever, it became clear that the measures claimed to weaken 
the presidential office were cosmetic, while some federal 
powers were even extended and some checks and bal-
ances removed: The president can now appoint regional 
procurators, municipalities are subordinated to federal 
and regional authorities, and the federation council can 
now dismiss federal judges at the president’s request.
At the same time, the state council, a circle headed by 
the president and including representatives of the presi-
dential administration, federal and regional government, 
the ruling party, and the heads of state corporations 
and banks, received constitutional status—providing 
a potential position for Putin from which to control the 
future president and prime minister. However, the spe-
cific structure of this council as well as its role remains 
in the dark as it depends on future legislation.
When looked at from the perspective of protest and 
oppositional mobilization, two other changes seem yet 
more significant. First, allowing federal authorities to 
exclude anyone from high state offices who, in the last 
25 years, has held a second citizenship or a temporary 
foreign residence permit potentially affects many future 
candidates who have worked or studied abroad. Second, 
the decision to give the constitution priority over inter-
national law will mean that Russia will no longer feel 
bound by decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights, which so far has been a slow but authoritative 
source of support for repressed activists.
Meanwhile, the reactions of the parliamentary 
opposition to these changes have been all but non-exis-
tent. The Communist Party’s (KPRF) Valeriy Rash-
kin warned of the dangers of cementing Putin’s power 
and abstained, as did another KPRF deputy. But most 
simply lamented the “package voting” practice that 
fused welcomed changes like the term limitation and the 
alignment of the minimum wage with the subsistence 
minimum with the unwelcomed strengthening of pres-
idential powers—and voted for the bill in the first read-
ing. In fact, since presidential projects are expected to 
attract unanimous support, it received zero no votes. The 
Communist’s leader Gennadiy Zyuganov even expressed 
hope that the second reading will accommodate the 
KPRF’s suggestions, like a constitutionally enshrined 
higher minimum wage.
Likewise, the non-parliamentary opposition rou-
tinely critiqued the initiative but at present is not coor-
dinating any resistance, for two reasons. First, the full 
scope of changes is still unclear. Navalny, for instance, 
speculated that the “worst amendments” will be intro-
duced in the second reading and called for patience until 
all planned changes are known.
Second, while about 22,000 people signed a peti-
tion calling the changes a “constitutional coup”, many 
liberals are not exactly enthusiastic about the existing 
super-presidential constitution and are thus unwill-
ing to jump to its defense. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy of the 
Yabloko party suggested to lobby for liberal changes 
instead, while Ivan Zhdanov, director of Navalny’s 
Anti-Corruption Foundation, declared that the con-
stitution itself contains mechanisms that have allowed 
authorities to ignore its liberal democratic elements. 
Navalny, as usual, found the most brutal and poig-
nant wording for this view: “The Russian Constitu-
tion is disgusting. (…) Under this constitution every-
thing has been taken away from us—from elections to 
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pensions—and they want to take even more. There’s 
no reason to protect it.”
Instead, the government change seemed to be more 
important for opposition actors and domestic observers, 
producing a flood of social media comments and op-eds. 
Navalny, who commented on the constitutional changes 
only reluctantly, published a 20-minute investigation 
into Prime Minister Mishustin’s private fortune only 
days after his appointment. Political scientist and lib-
eral analyst Kirill Rogov stressed that the changes com-
pared to the former government are smaller than they 
seem, with all new ministers harboring a  strong diri-
giste orientation, having been socialized almost exclu-
sively in state service under Putin. By contrast, others 
expressed the cautious hope that Mishustin will apply 
the orderly, tech-driven approach of his tax collection 
reforms to government transparency and implement 
higher government investment.
Taken together, these quickly administered changes 
raise more questions than answers, with the constitu-
tional amendments so far not prescribing a clear path 
for post-2024 politics. It seems therefore that an inten-
tion behind this maneuver was to signal security about 
who makes the next important steps—and introduce 
insecurity about what these steps could look like. Putin 
has thus created a state of coordinated confusion, which 
helps to uphold his first-mover advantage in the ongo-
ing operation ‘power preservation’.
About the Author
Jan Matti Dollbaum will be a post-doctoral researcher at the Research Centre for East European Studies at the Uni-
versity of Bremen from March 2020. This publication was produced as part of the research project “Comparing pro-
test actions in Soviet and post-Soviet spaces,” which is organized by the Research Centre for East European Studies 
at the University of Bremen with financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation.
Putin’s January Games: ‘Succession of Power’ on the Horizon
By Maria Domańska, Center for Eastern Studies (OSW)
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
In mid-January Vladimir Putin de facto initiated the process of institutional changes relating to the ‘suc-
cession of power’ expected in 2024. The proposals for 
constitutional amendments announced in his State of 
the Nation address indicate that most likely he will 
not run again for the post of president; in fact, he may 
resign even before 2024. The new, highly ambiguous 
legal-institutional architecture serves Putin’s primary 
goal, which is to retain decisive influence on state policy 
over the long term, independently of who will be elected 
the next president.
Formally, elements of checks and balances will be 
introduced into the Russian political system, with some 
weakening of the future president’s powers in favour 
of parliament. At the same time, we can expect even 
greater centralisation of state power and the preserva-
tion of authoritarianism. Along these lines, the changes 
include the further limitation of judicial independence 
and liquidation of the remnants of local government. For 
the time being, it seems that the most likely post-2024 
scenario will be that of Putin becoming the head of the 
State Council, after the status and role of this advisory 
body is considerably strengthened under the amended 
Constitution. Such changes could proceed to the point 
that the formal principle of separation of powers will 
be ultimately breached.
The ‘succession of power’ project will involve not 
only formal, but also informal changes in the system 
of state institutions. Since it is likely that no final deci-
sions have been taken in the Kremlin yet, we should 
now expect a longer period of testing various solutions 
to the ‘succession’ challenge, with all options remain-
ing on the table in the foreseeable future.
The significant personnel reshuffle in the Russian 
government seems to be part of the same political proc-
ess, as Putin needs effective managers to implement state 
policies in a potentially turbulent ‘succession’ period. 
The choice of Mikhail Mishustin for the post of prime 
minister might have been dictated by a dual motivation 
on the Kremlin’s part. First, he is considered a success-
ful bureaucrat who has the image of an efficient man-
ager and an expert in the new digital and information 
technologies, which constitute one of the declared prior-
ities for the development of the state. Second, Mishus-
tin has built informal ties with influential members of 
the ruling group who apparently trust him.
All signs indicate that the Mishustin cabinet will 
be a  technocratic government of experts expected to 
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fulfil the social promises Putin made in his address on 
15 January, as well as to implement the president’s socio-
economic ‘national projects’. The latter include the dig-
italisation of the state administration, scaling up Mis-
hustin’s successful work at the Federal Tax Service. In 
the Kremlin’s opinion, these issues are vital elements in 
strengthening the legitimacy of Putin’s regime and pro-
viding a substitute for the real modernisation of the state 
in a situation of growing public discontent.
The new cabinet members have been selected in 
a manner that will minimise the risk of conflicts or 
power games that might adversely affect the cabinet’s 
work. There is considerable evidence suggesting that 
Mishustin had a  significant influence on the govern-
ment make-up. Three of the nine deputy prime min-
isters (Grigorenko, Overchuk and Abramchenko) are his 
former associates, and three other deputy prime min-
isters (Golikova, Khusnullin and Chernychenko) have 
had friendly relations with him. At the same time, a spe-
cial task seems to have been assigned to Putin’s former 
assistant for economic affairs and the incumbent first 
deputy prime minister Andrei Belousov. His role will 
most likely be not only to formulate the government’s 
economic policy, but also to monitor the work of the 
prime minister and his entire cabinet. This is expected 
to enable the president to focus on the strategic ‘succes-
sion of power’ project in the coming years.
Mishustin’s cabinet of technocrats may initially 
receive a credit of trust from the public, but the effect 
of this refreshed image may pass quickly. The govern-
ment is unlikely to achieve any major successes in the 
socio-economic sphere, as the real reason for the eco-
nomic stagnation and the deteriorating living stand-
ards of the Russian public is not the make-up of the 
cabinet but the logic of the Russian socio-economic 
model. This model serves, above all, the vested interests 
of the corrupt government elite, and is unable to gen-
erate sustainable economic growth. The poor quality of 
management at the various levels of the state adminis-
tration also results from factors inherent in the system. 
They include an intentional ambiguity regarding legal 
regulations; the centralisation of decision-making proc-
esses and their non-transparent nature; and—last but 
not least—the political and business infighting within 
the ruling elite, in which law enforcement structures 
are frequently involved.
Therefore, Mishustin’s considerable management 
skills may bring only limited results. Hence, his gov-
ernment will most likely be a transitional one. Neverthe-
less, its individual members—provided that they prove 
their effectiveness and usefulness to the Kremlin—can 
earn a strong position in the gradually renewing ruling 
elite in the period before and after the so-called ‘suc-
cession of power’.
About the Author
Maria Domańska, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW). She specializes 
in Russian domestic politics, with a focus on Russian federal and regional elites, formal and informal aspects of the 
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The New Russian Government and Old Russian Problems
By Vladimir Gel’man, European University at St. Petersburg / University of Helsinki
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
In January 2020, Vladimir Putin dismissed Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s government and reshuf-
fled its leadership. Not only did he appoint a new prime 
minister, Mikhail Mishustin, but replaced about half the 
members of the cabinet. Gone are controversial officials, 
such as Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Mutko, respon-
sible for a series of doping scandals in Russian sport, 
and Culture Minister Vladimir Medinsky, who openly 
denied historical truth and promoted patriotic myths 
in an effort to burnish Russia’s image as a great power. 
New members of the cabinet of ministers tend to be 
more technocratic and younger than their predecessors; 
however, no observers expressed strong hopes that the 
new government would score policy successes. To what 
extent is this skepticism reasonable and what might Rus-
sia expect from these changes?
Since Soviet times, Russia’s cabinet of ministers dem-
onstrated little autonomy from the major centers of deci-
sion-making power, whether the Soviet Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party or later the Russian 
president and his administration. With some impor-
tant exceptions, the Russian government performed as 
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part of the state apparatus in charge of implementing 
the political leadership’s domestic policies, especially in 
the sphere of socio-economic development. Although 
individual ministers sometimes enjoyed sweeping power 
due to their personal connections and political patron-
age, overall the Russian government as a collective body 
has long been rather weak both politically and institu-
tionally. Cabinet members do not form a coherent team: 
they are appointed by the president on an individual 
basis, frequently without taking into account the pref-
erences of the prime minister. Moreover, ministers in 
charge of defense, security, foreign affairs, and justice 
are directly subordinated to the president rather than 
the prime minister. Numerous deputy prime ministers 
are responsible for coordinating the performance of var-
ious state agencies and overseeing the implementation of 
state programs and directives initiated by the president. 
In Medvedev’s cabinet, there were ten deputy prime min-
isters, and only one of them simultaneously served as a 
minister, in this case the minister of finance. Mishus-
tin reduced the number of deputy prime ministers to 
nine; none of them have ministerial posts. Given such 
complexity, the government appears as a conglomerate 
of different interest groups, which reflects the influence 
of various formal and informal political and economic 
actors. Mishustin’s cabinet is no exception, as some of 
its members are considered to be protégés of the prime 
minister himself or of the powerful Moscow mayor Ser-
gey Sobyanin.
Medvedev’s government deserved to resign because 
of its poor performance. Economic growth in Russia 
remains sluggish, real incomes for the Russian pop-
ulation have stagnated over several years, and Putin’s 
major policy initiative—stimulating Russia’s develop-
ment through the injection of state funds into numer-
ous “national projects” (ranging from construction of 
new roads to digitalization of governance)—was poorly 
implemented. In fact, large sums designated for the 
efforts were not spent. This is why Putin’s chief eco-
nomic advisor Andrey Belousov, a major proponent of 
state-led economic development and dirigisme, was pro-
moted to the position of first deputy prime minister in 
charge of economic policy (according to some sources, 
his appointment was not welcomed by Mishustin). The 
problem is that Belousov’s expansionist economic pref-
erences are in sharp contrast to the fiscal conservatives, 
Finance Minister Anton Siluanov and Central Bank of 
Russia head Elvira Nabiullina, so it is hard to expect 
economic policy consistency in Russia.
There is little hope that the government will achieve 
much. In many non-economic policy areas top person-
nel changes seems to be cosmetic, as some previous min-
isters were replaced by their second-tier subordinates. For 
example, in case of the Health Ministry, the oft-criti-
cized Veronika Skvortsova, who was in charge of the 
notoriously inefficient “optimization” of hospitals and 
scandals involving medication supply, has been replaced 
by Mikhail Murashko, former head of the Federal Ser-
vice for Surveillance in Healthcare, a major medical 
watchdog that is closely linked with the ministry. In a 
similar way, Olga Vasilieva, the ultra-conservative and 
Orthodox-leaning Minister of Enlightenment, passed 
her post to Sergey Kravtsov, who previously ran the Fed-
eral Service for Supervision in Education and Science 
and has been accused of plagiarizing his 2007 doctoral 
dissertation. Overall, the integrity of the new govern-
ment is open to question given the numerous examples 
in which Mishustin and his ministers were involved in 
dubious business activities. For example, the new prime 
minister’s wife and sister are wealthy, though no one can 
explain the sources of their enrichment. To put it bluntly, 
the new Russian government inherited the baggage of 
many old vices from its predecessor.
The policy promises of Mishustin may be summa-
rized as a “3D” solution. Like Medvedev, he champions 
deregulation, digitalization, and decentralization of the 
Russian economy as tools for improving the quality 
of governance in Russia. Although the advocates sup-
porting these solutions sound reasonable, the policy 
effects are most likely to be imperfect without a “4D” 
approach, which should include democratization as the 
No. 1 item on the agenda. However, such bold political 
moves lie beyond the mandate of this technocratic gov-
ernment and the lack of political reform explains why it 
is unlikely to promote the rule of law and accountabil-
ity. Such a disconnect may impose major constraints on 
the policy ambitions of reformers who remain subordi-
nated to Putin and his entourage.
About the Author
Vladimir Gel’man is Professor at the European University at St. Petersburg and the University of Helsinki.
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Planning for a (Not-So) Post-Putin Russia
By Andrei Kolesnikov, Carnegie Moscow Center
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
Of the constitutional reforms put forward by Putin, what will really change a lot is the proposal to give 
the Russian constitution—including repressive Russian 
legislation—priority over international law. This viola-
tion of the usual hierarchy is nothing short of a legal 
revolution.
Following the unexpected announcement of con-
stitutional changes in Russia and the resignation of the 
government, the question of whether or not Putinism 
will end with President Vladimir Putin has instantly 
become rhetorical. The president made it clear in his 
state of the nation address on January 15 that no one is 
going anywhere, despite the subsequent resignation of 
Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and his government, 
and swift replacement of the former with a low-profile 
technocrat, Mikhail Mishustin.
Putin’s casual suggestion that the status and role of 
the insignificant and until recently largely lifeless State 
Council should be enshrined in the constitution can 
only mean one thing: that Putin is preparing a new 
position for himself within that structure. If the State 
Council’s status gets a boost, the president could assume 
the status of national leader and head of that structure, 
which would carry out the role of a parallel presidential 
administration, or parallel government.
So imagine the following picture: Putin as head of 
the State Council and father of the nation; Medvedev 
as president, following a  snap election held after the 
constitutional reforms are approved by the public in 
a referendum; and a technocrat—Mishustin—as prime 
minister.
Medvedev has already proven his loyalty to Putin and 
acceptance of the hierarchy, having previously swapped 
jobs with Putin in 2008–2012 to enable him to over-
come the constitutional limit of two consecutive pres-
idential terms. In his new role as deputy head of the 
Security Council, Medvedev will not be the deputy of 
the council’s secretary, Nikolai Patrushev, but that of 
its chair: Putin. This means that Medvedev is de facto 
vice president, a good springboard for moving up to 
the post of president (again). He and Putin could even 
make a gentlemen’s agreement: Putin will be respon-
sible for everything good, while Medvedev will answer 
for everything bad.
After all, dissatisfaction with socioeconomic con-
ditions in the country is on the rise, and could grow 
rapidly during the four more years before the next pres-
idential election of 2024. For now, of course, this is 
merely a hypothesis. Putin didn’t reveal any details, but 
one point is evident: he will not allow himself to become 
a lame duck.
In proposing that the parliament should in future 
confirm the prime minister, Putin is channelling pub-
lic anger toward the next president, prime minister, and 
parliamentary speaker, since they will now share respon-
sibility for the appointment of government ministers and, 
accordingly, for their failings. This proposed reform also 
shows that any remaining illusions that Putin might sug-
gest someone for that position with liberal views, such as 
Alexei Kudrin, are now firmly in the realm of a utopia.
Putin’s announcement that the new prime minister 
will be the former head of the tax service, Mishustin, was 
both unexpected and yet unsurprising at the same time. 
It’s unsurprising in that Mishustin is an  ideal Putin-
backed candidate: the tax service has cozy ties to the 
security services, and its help has been enlisted to solve 
all sorts of issues, including business conflicts. With its 
adoption of digital technology, it’s also considered to be 
a well-oiled and smoothly functioning state structure.
At the same time, the appointment was counterin-
tuitive: Putin named someone that no one had expected. 
Sure, people were expecting a technocrat, but someone 
like the deputy prime minister responsible for digitaliza-
tion, Maxim Akimov. Mishustin was on no one’s radar. 
Now, with his help, Putin is going to build a country 
that resembles the Federal Tax Service: with reports and 
inspections, security assets, and—where necessary—the 
digitalization of the entire country.
Of the constitutional reforms put forward by Putin, 
what is truly important and really will change a lot is 
the proposal to give the Russian constitution—includ-
ing repressive Russian legislation—priority over inter-
national law. This is a violation of the usual hierarchy, 
in which international law always takes precedence over 
national law, and means that Russia can ignore any 
aspects of international law.
It also means that European Court of Human 
Rights rulings cannot be enforced. Russian opposi-
tion activists can appeal to Strasbourg until they are 
blue in the face, but Russian judicial institutions will 
be able to view the international court’s verdicts as 
incompatible with national legislation. These radical 
changes to Russia’s justice system are nothing short of 
a legal revolution.
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All this is apparently just the start. There is still plenty 
of intrigue ahead, not least regarding the makeup of the 
new government, what authority Medvedev will have, 
and the referendum over constitutional reform. The 
most interesting is still to come.
About the Author
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Do Institutions Matter in Putin’s Russia?
By Robert Orttung, George Washington University
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
President Vladimir Putin’s 15 January announce-ment of plans to amend Russia’s constitution and 
change the various institutions defining the political 
system in Russia offer a good opportunity to step back 
from the day-to-day flow of events and ask how institu-
tions matter in Russian politics and to what extent they 
shape the course of events and constrain behavior. The 
short answer is that institutions are important, but only 
in the context of their constant change. Russia’s con-
stantly shifting institutions mean that they have less 
importance than they would in more stable democratic 
countries.
At the highest level, Putin’s speech makes a strong 
case for arguing that institutions have little practical 
importance in Russia’s system of government. President 
Boris Yeltsin hand selected Putin as his successor in 1999 
and he has been in power ever since. Putin’s tenure in 
power now seems set to extend for 24 years and beyond 
despite the clear intention of the constitution at the time 
to limit presidents to two four-year terms. Putin let Dmi-
try Medvedev serve as president from 2008–2012 so that 
he could avoid the constitutional limit on two consec-
utive terms. While in office, Medvedev’s main achieve-
ment was to amend the constitution so that the presi-
dent could serve two six-year terms and now Putin is in 
the middle of his second of these. The fact that Putin 
has now announced a  series of changes that will pre-
sumably legitimate his extended stay in power beyond 
this additional 12 years suggests that the constitution 
puts few constraints on Putin’s behavior.
Of course, paradoxically, the fact that Putin has to 
make all these changes—announcing constitutional 
amendments to shift power among the presidency, par-
liament, and State Council—is because of the rules laid 
out in the constitution. In that sense, the institutions do 
matter and they shape the ways that Russia politics will 
evolve over the next few years as Putin tries to figure out 
a way to hang on to the top post while reorganizing the 
institutions to suit his current needs. Although the tools 
available to an authoritarian leader differ from those of 
his democratic counterparts, the leader is constantly fac-
ing threats from rivals who would like to replace him. 
To survive, the leader must always be one step ahead 
of those who might envision themselves as the leader.
The only constant in Russia’s current system is that 
Putin has no plans to leave the political stage. The exten-
sive corruption of the Putin regime would put Putin’s 
personal safety at risk if he were to pass power to a new 
president who might decide to prosecute him. If there 
was any doubt about such a scenario, recent events in 
Kyrgyzstan put them to rest. There former President 
Almazbek Atambayev (2011–2017) maneuvered Soor-
onbay Jeenbekov into office as his successor, but shortly 
after coming to power Jeenbekov turned on his erstwhile 
sponsor, who had begun to criticize him, and had him 
arrested for “rudely violating the constitution” in August 
2019.
What is important to remember about institutions in 
Russia is that their functioning is limited because they 
are in constant state of demolition and reconstruction. 
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This problem is most apparent in the case of the electo-
ral law. After each election, the Russian authorities draw 
conclusions about what weaknesses the voting demon-
strated in their ability to prolong their power and then 
make adjustments to strengthen their position and throw 
the opposition off guard. Various parliamentary elec-
tions in Russia have either increased the representation 
of single member districts or proportional representa-
tion based on the various electoral calculations of the 
political elite at the time. Currently, given the unpop-
ularity of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, there is 
some discussion of electing all legislators through single-
member districts, where party identity is less important. 
Ultimately, the electoral law for the 2021 parliamentary 
elections will reflect elite calculations about how they 
can best shape the institutions to their interests.
Certainly, Putin will not give up control over the 
legislative branch and allow it to provide checks on his 
power. Former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili 
transformed his republic from a presidential to parlia-
mentary system in an effort to extend his ability to hold 
on to power in 2013 as he was nearing the end of sec-
ond and last term as president. This effort failed, how-
ever, when Saakashvili lost the parliamentary elections 
and was forced to flee the country to avoid arrest. Putin 
is not going to let that happen to him.
So, to answer the question in the title, yes institutions 
do help shape the ebb and flow of Russia’s politics. But 
they put few effective constraints on a top leader will-
ing to shape the institutions to serve his personal inter-
ests rather than those of the country.
About the Author
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Putin’s Plan 2.0? What Might Stand Behind Russia’s Constitutional Reform
By Michael Rochlitz, University of Bremen
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
Vladimir Putin’s proposed constitutional changes dur-ing his annual State of the Nation speech on 15 Janu-
ary 2020, as well as the subsequent reshuffle of the gov-
ernment, have sparked a lively discussion among both 
Russian and foreign commentators. What does Putin 
have in mind? What is the purpose of a  reform that 
many have difficulties interpreting?
One point on which most observers agree is that the 
reform, most likely, has both a long-term and a short-
term objective. In the longer term, the objective is polit-
ical. Putin’s fourth term as Russian president ends in 
2024, and according to the current constitution, he can-
not run for a third consecutive term in office. The pro-
posed changes to the constitution, moreover, suggest 
that he does not intend to run again for president, as 
the removal of the clause “in a row” clearly limits the 
maximum number of possible presidential terms to two.
Even though the parliament seems to be somewhat 
strengthened by the reform, a  solution with Putin as 
prime minister is unlikely. Putin clearly did not enjoy 
his stint as prime minister between 2008 and 2012. In 
addition, the low popularity of the pro-government party 
United Russia makes it implausible that Putin would 
want to link his political future to this organization.
Most observers suggest that Putin is assuming a role 
as final arbiter and father of the nation, somewhere 
above the hubbub of daily politics. Following the exam-
ple of his former Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazar-
bayev, Putin could assume a post as head of the newly 
strengthened State Council, or the Security Council, or 
both. In a certain sense, this would reproduce the Soviet 
model, with the State Council resurrecting the Central 
Committee, and the Security Council the Politburo. 
Once again, actual power would then lie with this par-
allel structure, while the executive—the presidency and 
the government—would only be of secondary impor-
tance. The fact that Dmitry Medvedev has already been 
appointed to a newly created post as Deputy Chairman 
of the Security Council provides evidence in support of 
this scenario.
The short-term objective of the recent government 
reshuffle is the economy. Since 2012, Russia’s economy 
has been stagnating. The government of Prime Min-
ister Dmitry Medvedev has shown itself exceptionally 
incompetent and unable to address the problem. Worse, 
it has been utterly discredited by the relentless corrup-
tion investigations that Alexey Navalny’s Anti-Corrup-
tion Foundation publish regularly. If things had contin-
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ued as in the past, the possibility of some kind of sudden 
crash would have been very real.
Although few observers had Mikhail Mishustin in 
their books, with hindsight his appointment as new 
prime minister makes a  lot of sense. Among Russia’s 
high-level state officials, Mishustin is almost the only 
one with a clear record of success, having fruitfully 
reformed the Federal Taxation Service between 2010 
and 2020. Both the political establishment and the busi-
ness community respect him as a  skilled technocrat, 
a regard Medvedev had lost long ago. If somebody can 
provide the Russian economy with new momentum, he 
might be the man.
Still, is it going to work? Concerning the long-term 
objective and Putin’s political future, nobody really 
knows. Indeed, it is quite likely that Putin will surprise 
everyone with an option nobody had in mind, once the 
time comes, as he has done many times before.
However, the real problem might actually be situated 
with the short-term objective, even though this aspect 
of the recent changes has attracted much less attention 
than the constitutional reform. The difficulties Rus-
sia’s economy is suffering from are well known, and 
have recently been nicely summarized by Konstantin 
Sonin in an article for the Russian newspaper Vedomosti. 
First, for an economy in the 21st century to be success-
ful, being well integrated into global networks of trade, 
exchange and technology transfer is imperative. Here, 
the siloviki-driven isolation since at least 2014 has been 
clearly harmful and counter-productive, and should be 
ended as soon as possible.
Second, within the country the heavy-handed—and 
still increasing—focus on economic and political control 
has been dragging down the economy like a leaden blan-
ket. For an economy to be innovative, the free exchange 
of ideas in open networks among businessmen, scien-
tists, and other social actors is of crucial importance. 
Unfortunately, it is exactly this kind of collaboration 
and collective action that Russia’s various security ser-
vices have been busy suppressing during the last eight 
years. In this respect, the recent attempt to limit con-
tacts between Russian and foreign scientists is just the 
latest of a large number of examples.
Finally, the replacement of Medvedev by Mishustin 
has not solved what is probably the most fundamental 
problem of the Russian economy. Russia is clearly what 
the social-science literature would describe as a limited 
access order, i.e. a society where the ruling elites use their 
rents to limit access to economic and political possibil-
ities, in order to perpetuate the status quo and enjoy 
the benefits of resource-redistribution among a limited 
group of insiders.
To solve Russia’s economic problems, this system 
would have to be fundamentally reformed, as the entire 
logic underpinning its existence is limiting the emer-
gence of new talent and ideas. However, such a reform is 
a completely different animal than simply restructuring 
the tax service, and therefore—most probably—beyond 
the ability of Prime Minister Mishustin.
Ironically, it is possible that it is exactly Mishustin’s 
inability to solve Russia’s systemic economic problem 
that could lead to the political crisis, which, in turn, 
could initiate more fundamental change. If this eventu-
ality materializes, focusing in January 2020 on constitu-
tional reform and the 2024 political succession might 
prove to have been premature.
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The Reality of Russia’s Constitutional Reform: Limited Institutional 
Change Masks a Profound Shift in Economic Policy
By Regina Smyth, Indiana University
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
Russia’s 2020 constitutional reforms aim at two con-siderable regime challenges: the short-term problem 
of managing the 2021–2024 national election cycle and 
the longer-term persistent problem of building Russian 
state capacity to enable economic and political modern-
ization. In response to these challenges, President Putin 
proposed two broad solutions, constitutional reform 
and a  redefinition of state-society relations rooted in 
expanded social spending programs.
Having precluded the emergence of a national suc-
cessor, Putin remains the sole figure in the political land-
scape who can contain elite-infighting and predictably 
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win national elections. As a result, his departure from 
the political arena is fraught. Succession could resem-
ble the devastating oligarch wars of the 1990s as elites 
compete to protect their wealth, power, and access to 
political rents. This conflict would spill over into elec-
toral politics prompting opposition mobilization and 
unraveling the Putin system.
Uncertainty could also have high personal costs to 
Putin, who is vulnerable to charges of corruption and 
abuse of power. Proposed reforms provide him with 
a chance to audition new proteges and potential suc-
cessors who can insulate him from these threats as he 
prepares to exit the political arena in the next decade.
Importantly, constitutional reform did not resolve 
Putin’s formal role in the new system. Proposed amend-
ments define a range of possible strategies for Putin to 
remain in an influential state position after 2024. Two 
potential options, to return to the prime minister posi-
tion or to take up the leadership of the newly empow-
ered State Council, require a staunchly loyal presiden-
tial successor. The alternative maintains the status quo. 
Given systemic reform, Putin can claim the right to 
return to the presidency—an office that is even stronger 
under the new system. The path forward will be decided 
after the outcome of the next parliamentary elections 
and will be subject to change should unexpected eco-
nomic or political shocks occur.
What is striking is that all of these institutional 
reforms place a  strong bet on the regime’s ability to 
control election outcomes. The Kremlin appears confi-
dent that a well-developed set of practices that bias elec-
tions in the regime’s favor, and particularly new elec-
tronic voting systems, will continue to deliver victories 
without sparking mass protests.
The longer-term goals of the reforms are to build 
state capacity and develop mechanisms that replace 
personalism as the fulcrum that balances elite conflict 
and ensures social support. In other words, Putin must 
solve problems that have challenged the regime since he 
took office. In this iteration, the failure to significantly 
diminish presidential power side steps a core challenge 
to strengthening the state and maintains the winner-
take-all nature of elite contestation.
Moreover, the revised system remains consistent with 
existing informal presidential powers from the capacity to 
distribute rents to media control. Constitutional reforms 
do not define a ladder of ambition or pathway to create 
a new crop of potential rulers, maintaining the role of net-
works and ties as a critical determinant of political career 
success. They also do not define an institutional solution 
to elite conflict—as was present in the pre-1995 Mexican 
PRI—although clear term limits suggest such a mech-
anism could emerge from within United Russia regulations.
Such a mechanism could mitigate elite conflict but 
does not address the need to forge electoral majorities 
to secure office. While the announced changes do not 
directly alter voting procedures, Putin and his proxies 
presented the constitutional reform as a tool to increase 
government responsiveness and amplify citizens’ voices. 
This approach creates the potential to win social support 
by responding to core citizen demands without com-
promising the regime agenda or relinquishing politi-
cal control.
To solidify this support, the president announced 
a new national goal: increased living standards. Pro-
posed constitutional reforms include amendments to 
guarantee annual adjustments of pensions and a federal 
minimum wage. These proposals partially offset persist-
ent anger over the 2018 pension reform program that 
increased the national retirement age. Prime Minister 
Mitushin’s government amplified institutional reform 
with new social spending, including increased bene-
fits for families with young children and a nation-wide 
housing reconstruction program. These programs tap 
into core social demands without compromising state 
priorities.
Taking a page out of Keynesian economics, Putin 
is bargaining that more government spending will bol-
ster consumer spending and investment and promote 
economic growth. This approach to economic policy 
marks a significant change in the regime’s conservative 
pattern of economic management. Russia continued to 
invest in its national “rainy day” fund throughout the 
economic downturn amassing a sizable buffer against 
international financial crises.
While these spending increases may be nothing more 
than a short-term project designed to ensure a United 
Russia supermajority in the 2021 election, they may also 
signal a significant change in the Putin system. Renewed 
social welfare programs could indicate the emergence 
of a more permanent social contract that will restore 
the paternalism of the late Soviet period. Alternatively, 
broad spending could emerge as a form of state popu-
lism that pits the state and its loyal citizens against dis-
senters influenced by outside forces. In both cases, the 
regime can rely on social programs as carrots and sticks 
to reward loyal voters with regional transfers, benefits 
to social groups, and targeted spending.
In the longer term, these changes in the definition 
of state-society relations are potentially more significant 
than the formal amendments or the reinforcement of 
existing informal practices to maintain oligarchy. They 
are also risky. The regimes’ advertisement for improved 
quality of life will raise social expectations about state 
performance and the quality of services in the context 
of a geriatric system that has been in power for 20 years. 
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If the government fails to meet expectations, the short-
term project to insulate the ruler and his cronies is vul-
nerable to political unrest, and medium-term state devel-
opment will be complicated.
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Waiting for Change?
By Andrei Yakovlev, National Research University – Higher School of Economics
DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000398331
Vladimir Putin’s announcement on 15 January about amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Fed-
eration attracted the attention of a wide range of experts. 
However, in Russian realities, it is not so much the laws 
(including the Constitution) that matter, but the prac-
tice of enforcing them. In this context, the real signif-
icance for political life in the country comes not from 
the Constitutional amendments, but the decision to 
change the government.
Commenting on this event, it makes sense to focus 
on three questions:
1. What signal does the change of government give to 
the current elites?
2. Why was this decision taken now (and, for example, 
not in May 2018, when Vladimir Putin’s new pres-
idential term began)?
3. What should we expect from the new Russian 
government?
The answer to the first question seems quite unambig-
uous—the country is witnessing a change of generations 
in the bureaucratic elite. This process began in 2017–
2018 with the renewal of the governors, when the Krem-
lin began to appoint young technocrats. Now it is the 
turn of the federal ministers. The general trend is that 
the new cadres must demonstrate both loyalty (as they 
did since the mid-2000s), but also the ability to solve 
problems in their area of responsibility using the avail-
able limited resources. This personnel renewal took place 
among the economic cabinet in the government, but it 
has hardly affected the security cabinet, whose repre-
sentatives in recent years played a key role in strategic 
decision-making.
There are different possible answers to the second 
question about timing. On the one hand, it looks like 
the Kremlin, aware of the scale of the tension in society, 
is simply trying to use the government as a “lightning 
rod”—shifting to Dmitry Medvedev and his ministers 
the responsibility for the economic stagnation and the 
lack of prospects for implementing the national projects 
Putin announced in 2018. But, on the other hand, one 
could assume that the old government was deliberately 
“held in place” so that it could then be blamed for the 
negative consequences of some strategic decisions—the 
pension reform and the “optimization” of the health 
care system. According to such logic, the old govern-
ment could leave having done what it was supposed to 
do and the new government is summoned to address 
a new agenda.
Finally, what should we expect of the new prime 
minister and his team? One option is that the govern-
ment will have to focus on implementing the national 
projects so that by the 2021 parliamentary elections the 
Kremlin can report visible positive results for society 
in specific sectors. This answer is the most simple and 
obvious. But it likely distracts attention from the main 
problem—implementing the projects does not depend 
on the ministers or governors, but concrete people at the 
level of companies, public sector entities, and munici-
palities using the resources accessible to them. The cur-
rent design of the national projects directly assumes 
their significant co-financing by the regions and busi-
nesses. If these players do not see prospects for eco-
nomic development as well as a positive vision of the 
future for the country and their place in it, they will not 
have an incentive to invest. This means that even with 
effective managers in the ministerial posts, the national 
projects (and the related social promises of 2018) will 
not be implemented.
Another way to answer the question of the Govern-
ment’s objectives is possible, based on the above alter-
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native interpretation of the reasons for the resignation 
of the old Cabinet. In order to assess the effectiveness 
of Medvedev’s government, which was in power for 
almost 8 years, it is important to understand correctly 
what tasks it actually solved. Obviously, between 2012 
and 2014 it tried to implement the May decrees of 2012, 
though it did this mainly by mobilizing the resources of 
the regional budgets. But since 2014, Medvedev’s gov-
ernment—judging not by declarations, but by practical 
actions—mostly accumulated reserves to be prepared 
for “emergency circumstances.”
This category could include a wide range of phe-
nomena potentially threatening national security, from 
the toughening Western sanctions and Russia’s involve-
ment in new military conflicts to the oil price drop in 
world markets and mass social protests at home. The 
refusal to support the ruble during its collapse in the 
fall of 2014 and the unprecedented rise in the Central 
Bank’s interest rate after that; the sharp increase in the 
share of gold in the foreign exchange reserves; the fed-
eral government’s renunciation of its social obligations 
during the pension reform and “optimization” of the 
health care system all can be seen as part of a consis-
tent economic policy. And if the task of the old govern-
ment was to maintain the current stability while build-
ing up reserves for a “rainy day,” then it has generally 
met these challenges.
However, such a policy has a fundamental problem. 
The dominance of security priorities in making strate-
gic decisions, as well as focusing on minimizing risks 
and maintaining socio-political stability in the short 
term, blocks opportunities for development and gener-
ates tension in society. As a result, the government loses 
the ability to provide stability for the long term, which 
is fraught with serious political cataclysms for the rul-
ing elite. If we assume that people in the Kremlin have 
become aware of this problem, the new government 
may be given carte blanche to develop and implement 
a new economic development strategy that would be 
convincing for business and administrative elites and 
could gain public trust.
Against the background of the political events and 
intra-elite conflicts in 2019, such a scenario seems rather 
unlikely. Whether it can be implemented in practice 
will become clear in the spring. To reverse the current 
trend towards stagnation in the economy, it is neces-
sary to change expectations. Naming a new govern-
ment elicited a moderate optimism within society based 
on the appearance of new faces. If these new people 
develop a vague new agenda oriented toward develop-
ment, the current positive expectations could strengthen 
and become a factor of economic dynamism. But, if in 
the course of 2–3 months, a new agenda does not appear, 
expectations will be dispelled and Russia will return to 
the rut in which it has been in recent years.
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Figure 1: With Which of the Following Opinions on the Role of the Constitution in the Life of the Country Do You 
Agree Most? (%; one answer)
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Russian Public Opinion on the Planned Amendments to the Constitution
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The Constitution guarantees civil rights and freedoms
The Constitution maintains order in activities of the State
The Constitution is a means for the President to control the Duma
The Constitution does not play a significant role in the life of the country, since very few people defer to it
It is difficult to say
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, November 1997 to 23–29 January 2020 (N for the latest poll: 1600), published on 31 January 2020, https://
www.levada.ru/2020/01/31/konstitutsiya/; captions from https://www.levada.ru/en/2014/12/23/russian-citizens-on-the-constitution/
Figure 2: Have You Heard about the Initiative of Vladimir Putin to Amend the Russian Constitution?  
(%; one answer)
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You have heard something about this
You are hearing about this for the first time
It is difficult to say
Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 23–29 January 2020 (N = 1600), published on 31 January 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/01/31/konstitutsiya/
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Figure 3: There are various opinions for the reasons behind Vladimir Putin’s proposals to amend the Russian con-
stitution. Some say that the constitution is being amended primarily in order to improve the governing 
of the state and in the interests of a majority of the country’s population; others claim that the constitu-
tion is being amended primarily for the benefit of Vladimir Putin himself, in order to expand his powers 
and to allow him to remain in power after 2024. With which opinion do you agree most of all?
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Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 23–29 January 2020 (N = 1600), published on 31 January 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/01/31/konstitutsiya/
Figure 4: In Your Opinion, Has the Government under Prime Minister Medvedev Been Able to Improve the Situ-
ation of the Country?
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Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 23–29 January 2020 (N = 1600), published on 4 February 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/02/04/deyatelnost-
pravitelstva-3/
Figure 5: Had You Heard of Mikhail Mishustin Before Vladimir Putin Suggested Him as Candidate for the Position 
of Prime Minister of Russia?
Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 23–29 January 2020 (N = 1600), published on 4 February 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/02/04/deyatelnost-
pravitelstva-3/
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Figure 6: In your opinion, what is the most likely result of the recent changes in the government: an improvement 
of the situation in the country, a deterioration of the situation in the country, or no change?
■ Improvement ■ Deterioration ■  No change ■ It is difficult to say
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Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 23–29 January 2020 (N = 1600), published on 4 February 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/02/04/deyatelnost-
pravitelstva-3/
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Figure 7: In What Role Would You Like to See Vladimir Putin afer the End of his Presidential Term in 2024?
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Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 23–29 January 2020 (N = 1600), published on 30 January 2020, https://www.levada.ru/2020/01/30/
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